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GOD vs. THE GAVEL: A BRIEF REJOINDER
Douglas Laycock*
I recently reviewed' God vs. the Gavel by Professor Marci Hamilton,
and she published a brief response.' My review briefly summarized the book
and then made three principal points, addressing Hamilton's institutional
competence thesis, 4 her "no-harm" principle, 5 and the remarkable number of
legal and factual errors in the book.6 In this reply, I will review each of these
points in turn.
I.

INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE

The book's central legal claim is that only legislators may legitimately
exempt religious behavior from regulation, and then only by enacting specific rules rather than generally applicable standards. Yet Hamilton
condemns the legislature's bad judgment, its inadequate process, and its
frequent secrecy. Her examples of exemptions that should not have been
granted were nearly all granted by legislatures, not courts. I found her preference for legislatures "incomprehensible" in light of her critical assessment
of legislative capacities and performance.
Her only response is that I have confused an "ought" with an "is"-that
legislatures ought to conform to her proposed rules even though they have
not done so "of late.'"' But on questions of institutional competence, who
"ought" to decide necessarily depends on an "is"--on the actual strengths
and weaknesses of existing institutions. That is the whole point of debates
about institutional competence. Arguing that Congress ought to do things
beyond its capacities is like arguing that earthworms ought to fly, even if
none of them have done so lately.
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Most of the defects that Hamilton identified in the legislative process,
and most of the additional defects that I identified, 9 are inherent in the process. These defects flow from the pressures of the political process and from
the unmanageable demands on legislators' time. They cannot be wished
away by saying that legislators "ought" to do better.
Hamilton has great faith in the potential of legislative hearings; I explained at some length why this faith is "divorced from reality."' I argued
that on a question sufficiently focused for the judicial process, judges can
devote more time and attention, have a more reliable fact-finding process,
and are more likely to make a principled judgment that takes both sides seriously. Her only response is to repeat what she said in the book and to
claim that her view "is a non-controversial statement of fact."" A real response would have to address the argument and evidence offered in the
review. The comparative institutional competence of courts and legislatures
to resolve requests to exempt particular religious practices from regulation is
the fundamental disagreement between us, and the fundamental legal claim
in her book. To simply assert that her view of that question is noncontroversial is to assume her conclusion.

II. THE NO-HARM

PRINCIPLE

The book opens with the proposition that churches should be subject to
all the regulation that restricts other organizations, "unless they can prove
that exempting them will cause no harm to others" (p. 5). I showed that that
standard is untenable if taken literally, and that by the end of the book,
Hamilton had agreed that the real question "is one of balancing" harm
against liberty (p. 297). She now says that she intended a balancing test2
from the beginning and never meant for "no harm" to be taken literally.1
She seems to think that
if I had remembered my John Stuart Mill, I would
3
have understood that.
It is good to have her confirm in print that "no harm" is not intended literally. But if I misread her, I am sure that I will not be the only one. The
book gets much of its impact from the rhetoric of "no" harm. She accentuates that rhetorical effect by calling it the "no-harm principle" instead of
using the more common phrase, the "harm principle."
"No" harm is what she actually says, early in her introduction (p. 5) and
again in the concluding phrase of her introduction (p. 11). It would have
been so easy to clarify on page 5, instead of on page 297, that she really
means to balance harms, and that balancing inevitably leads to "little" harm,

9.

Laycock, supra note 1, at 1174-75.

10.

Id. at 1174.

11.

Hamilton, supra note 3, at 1190.

12.

Id.at 1191.

13.

See id.

God vs. the Gavel

May 2007]

1547

not to "no" harm.Her intended audience of voters and legislators does not
read responses to academic book reviews, and many of them no doubt quit
reading long before page 297.
Even if Mill had appeared much earlier, generically invoking Mill would
not clarify whether "no harm" really means balance of harms. A leading
Mill scholar describes the harm principle as "largely an empty formula;" 5
everything depends on what counts as harm. The better interpretations require harms to be evaluated on multiple criteria and weighed against the
harm of invading liberty. 6 But in political debate, interest groups have
learned to claim that they are harmed by any conduct they wish to regulate.
"Claims of harm have become so pervasive that the harm principle has become meaningless."' 7 In this political tradition, the harm principle does
indeed morph into a demand for absolutely "no" harm. Hamilton's book is
principally a political demand for greater regulation of churches, and it is
entirely reasonable for readers to assume that it is written in this political
tradition-to assume that she means what she says about "no harm."
Whatever Hamilton intended, the danger of her no-harm rhetoric is precisely that it encourages the political demand for absolute safeguards against
any risk of any effect that any person perceives as any degree of any kind of
harm. She tells legislators that they must regulate churches unless churches
"prove" that an exemption will cause "no harm" (p. 5). She seems to mean it
literally; she repeatedly appears to reject distinctions among harms," and
some of her examples involve slight and attenuated harms to doubtful claims
of entitlement."' Even if it were only a clarification and not a change of position, clarifying at page 297 is too little, too late.
III.

ERRORS AND FALSEHOODS

I documented an "extraordinary number of errors, often with regard to
famous cases and basic doctrines." 20 Hamilton has not disputed any of the
errors I identified. Her response claims that a draft of my review contains
"many ...errors" of my own, but the only one she has identified is a mistaken conjunction in quoting the book's title.2'
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Without addressing any specific claim of error, she says that I assume
that any interpretation of free exercise cases other than my own "is somehow false."22 But I did not label her position on such interpretive issues as
false or even erroneous in the sense in which the review charges her with2 3
errors. Twice I said that "reasonable people can disagree" about an issue,
language one never finds in Hamilton's writings. Three times I suggested
that she might have some argument she had not made. 24 I labeled as erroneous or misleading only statements that were objectively wrong, plus one
statement where her asserted interpretation seemed clearly wrong to me and
she had never offered any argument or explanation for it. 21 It is not a matter
of interpretation to accurately state whether a court dismissed all the counts
of a complaint against a priest and a bishop, or only some of the counts
against the bishop and none of the counts against the priest.26 Not all the
errors I identified were that obvious, but I deliberately omitted any that
seemed fairly arguable, and she has not argued with the specifics that remain.
Instead of addressing the errors, she complains that the review is uncivil. 27 There is nothing remotely uncivil about Part II, which argues with
her two principal theses, and very little that could be thought uncivil about
Part I, which summarizes the book. If the review is uncivil, it is because Part
III points out many errors, bluntly and without sugar coating. Only a few
sentences, mostly in the introduction, conclusion, and title, characterize the
book in judgmental terms-and those judgments are based on the detailed
argument in Part III. Whatever readers think about those judgments, I hope
they will focus on the argument. The argument in Part III proceeds with
close attention to facts and a minimum of rhetoric or debatable claims. If it
were uncivil to point out numerous errors-even when they far exceed in
number and magnitude the inevitable errors that creep into any lengthy
manuscript-then error-ridden books would be immune from criticism.
Hamilton has promised that if any of my "technical concerns have
merit," she will "take full responsibility and make the appropriate changes
in the paperback version. 28 We will see. But remember that I did not citecheck the whole book for her. I investigated only those passages that appeared wrong on first reading.
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IV. CONCLUSION

It is common ground between Professor Hamilton and me that "some religious behavior must be regulated,"2 9 and that "religious believers have no
right to inflict significant harm on nonconsenting others."30 But compiling
anecdotes of religious behavior that should be regulated, even if all the behavior were egregious and all the anecdotes were accurate, does not tell us
what to do about any other religious behavior. Anecdotes of bad behavior do
not tell us what religious behavior should be regulated and what exempted,
what should be the standards for granting exemptions, or who should decide
exemption questions in particular cases. Those are the essential points of
disagreement, and with respect to those points, Professor Hamilton's response does nothing to rehabilitate the unpersuasive claims in the book.
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